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Stealth Compensation  via Retirement Benefits
Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
This  Article  analyzes  an  important form  of  "stealth  compensation"
provided to managers of public companies. We  show how  boards have been
able to camouflage large amounts of  executive compensation through the use of
retirement benefits and payments. Our study illustrates  the significant role that
camouflage  and stealth  compensation play  in  the  design  of compensation
arrangements. It also highlights the importance of having information about
compensation arrangements  not only publicly available  but also communicated
in a way that is transparent  and accessible  to outsiders.
To  improve  the  transparency of  executives'  retirement payments  and
benefits,  we  propose several changes  in  current disclosure requirements.
Among other things, firms should be required to report to investors each year
the dollar value of all the retirement benefits to which their executives become
entitled. For example, firms should disclose to investors the annual buildup in
the actuarial  value of executives' retirement  plans, as well as the tax savings
reaped by  executives at the company's expense  through the use of deferred
compensation arrangements.  Firms should also disclose to investors each year
the present value  of all  the  retirement benefits  their top  executives  have
accumulated.
I. INTRODUCTION
This  Article  focuses  on  an  important  form  of  "stealth  compensation"
provided  to  managers  of  public  companies.  We  show  how  designers  of
compensation  arrangements  for these  managers  have been  able  to camouflage
large amount of executive  compensation through  the use of retirement benefits
and payments.  Our  study highlights  the  significant  role  that  camouflage  and
stealth  compensation  play  in  the  design  of compensation  arrangements.  Our
study  also  highlights  the  importance  of  ensuring  that  information  about
compensation arrangements  not only be placed in the public domain but also be
communicated in a way that is transparent and accessible to outsiders.
We begin by discussing the critical role of outrage  costs and camouflage  in
the  setting  of executive  compensation.  Managers  have  considerable  influence
over their pay and use their influence  to extract pay that is both higher and less
performance  sensitive  than  arm's-length  bargaining  with  the  board  would
produce.  The  difference  between  what  managers'  power  enables  them  to
receive and what they would receive  under arm's-length bargaining  constitutes
"rents."  Managers'  ability to extract rents, however, is hardly unlimited.  WhenBerkeley Business Law Journal
a  board  approves  a  compensation  arrangement  that  favors  managers  at  the
expense  of shareholders,  executives  and directors  will  bear  certain  economic
and  social  costs.  The  magnitude  of  these  costs  will  depend  on  how  the
arrangement  is perceived by outsiders whose views matter to  the directors and
executives.  An  arrangement  that  is  perceived  as  outrageous  might  reduce
shareholders'  willingness to  support incumbents  in a proxy contest or takeover
bid,  might  lead to  shareholder pressure  on managers  and directors,  and might
embarrass directors  and managers or harm their reputations.  The more outrage
a  compensation  arrangement  is  expected  to  generate,  the  more  reluctant
directors  will  be  to  approve  it  and  the  more  hesitant  managers  will  be  to
propose  it in the first place.
The  critical  role of outsiders'  perception  of executives'  compensation,  and
the significance  of outrage costs, explain the importance  of "camouflage."  The
desire  to  minimize  outrage  gives  designers  of compensation  arrangements  a
strong  incentive  to  try  to  obscure  and  justify-or,  more  generally,  to
camouflage-both  the  level  and  performance-insensitivity  of  executive
compensation.  Camouflage  thus  allows  executives  to  reap  benefits  at  the
expense of shareholders.  More importantly,  attempts to camouflage can lead to
the  adoption  of  inefficient  compensation  structures  that  harm  managers'
incentives  and  in turn  company performance,  imposing  even  greater  costs on
shareholders.
We  discuss elsewhere how  various  forms of non-retirement  compensation,
including bonuses,  stock option plans, and executive loans, have been designed
with an eye to camouflaging rents and minimizing outrage.'  In this Article,  we
examine  how retirement  arrangements  have often been designed  in a way that
serves this goal. As disclosure requirements for executive salaries, bonuses, and
long-term compensation have become stricter, firms have increasingly turned to
post-retirement  payments  and benefits as ways to compensate  managers.  Post-
retirement  value has  been provided to executives  through  four main  channels:
retirement  pensions,  deferred  compensation,  post-retirement  perks,  and
guaranteed  consulting fees. As  we will explain,  these methods  enable firms to
provide  a  substantial  amount  of  performance-insensitive  value  in  a  less
transparent  form than, say,  salary. Firms have used these channels to make less
transparent  both  the  total  amount  of compensation  received by managers  and
the extent to which pay is decoupled from managers'  own performance.
Before  describing  outrage  costs  and  camouflage  in  more  detail  and
discussing  each  of the four  channels,  we  should  note  two  attributes  they  all
1.  See  Lucian  Arye  Bebchuk  et  al.,  Managerial Power  and  Rent  Extraction in the  Design of
Executive Compensation,  69  U. CI. L.  REV.  751,  795-837  (2002); Lucian  Arye  Bebchuk  & Jesse M.
Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. EcON.  PERSP.  71,  81-87  (Summer,  2003);
LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:  THE UNFULFILLED  PROMISE
OF EXECUTIVE  COMPENSATION  chs. 9-14 (Harvard University  Press, 2004).
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share.  First, these  arrangements differ substantially  from those that firms  elect
to  provide  to  other  employees.  Although  firms  often  provide  pensions  and
deferred  compensation to lower-level  employees,  they do  so only  to the extent
that these arrangements  receive  a tax subsidy. This pattern suggests that, absent
such a subsidy, pensions and  deferred compensation are generally not efficient.
Yet  most of the arrangements  provided to executives  do not enjoy similar  tax
advantages.  Furthermore,  consistent  with  economists'  belief  that  in-kind
benefits  are  inefficient,  firms  do not generally  provide  retired  employees  with
coverage  for  specified  consumption  expenses.  Such  benefits  are,  however,
given  to  high-level  executives.  And  although  firms  occasionally  use  retired
employees  as consultants when the need arises, they generally do not guarantee
lifetime consulting fees to any employees other than executives.
The  second  shared  attribute  of these  various  retirement  payments  is  that
they  all  make  it possible  to obscure  large amounts  of performance-decoupled
compensation.  As  we  shall  see,  firms  do  not  have  to  disclose  the  value
transferred  to  executives  through  these  channels  in  the  same  way  that  other
forms of compensation-such  as  salary, bonuses,  and stock options-must  be
disclosed.  Retirement  payments  hence  offer  what  might  be  called  "stealth
compensation. ' " 2  Indeed,  the  dollar  figures  used  by  the  media  in  reporting
compensation  levels,  and by  financial  economists  in  their studies,  usually  do
not include the large value provided to executives through retirement benefits.
The  remainder  of this  Article  proceeds  as  follows.  Part  II  describes  the
importance  of  outrage  costs  and  camouflage  in  the  setting  of  executive
compensation. Part  III discusses the  widespread use of supplemental  executive
retirement  plans  (SERPs).  It  explains  how  SERPs  differ  from  the  pension
benefits  provided  to  regular  employees  and  how  they  can  be  used  to
camouflage  a  significant amount  of performance-insensitive  compensation  to
executives.  Part IV discusses  the  deferred  compensation  arrangements  offered
to managers.  It describes how these plans differ from the 401(k) plans  offered
to  other  employees  and how  these plans,  like  SERPs,  are  used to  provide  a
significant amount of performance-decoupled  pay to executives  in a way that is
largely hidden from view. Part V considers the use of post-retirement perks and
consulting contracts. Part VI  explains why increased transparency of retirement
arrangements would be beneficial to shareholders and proposes several changes
to the disclosure  requirements  for retirement  payments  and  benefits.  Part VII
concludes.
2.  We  borrow  the  term  "stealth  compensation"  from  Robert  Monks,  who  used  it  to  refer  to
executives'  stock  option  compensation  because  that  form  of payment  is  not  expensed  on  the  firm's
income  statement.  ROBERT  A.  G. MONKS,  THE EMPEROR'S  NIGHTINGALE:  RESTORING  THE  INTEGRITY
OF THE  CORPORATION IN  THE AGE OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM  59-62 (Perseus Books,  1999).Berkeley Business Law Journal
II. OUTRAGE  COSTS AND CAMOUFLAGE
This  Part  explores  the  role  and  significance  of  outrage  costs  and
camouflage  in the setting of executive  compensation. Section IL.A explains why
outsiders'  perceptions  and the  possibility  of outrage  are  of concern  to  boards
when they  fashion pay packages  for  managers.  Section  lI.B describes  the  key
role of camouflage  in the design  of compensation  arrangements.  Section  II.C
provides  empirical  evidence  on  the  effect  of  outrage  and  camouflage  on
managerial pay.
A.  The Importance  of Outsiders'Perceptions
As we discuss and document in great detail elsewhere, 3 top executives  have
considerable  influence  on their own pay arrangements.  Although  directors  are
supposed  to negotiate with executives  at arm's-length, they have both financial
and  non-financial  incentives  to provide  managers  with pay  arrangements  that
favor managers  at  the expense  of shareholders.  A  variety of psychological  and
social  factors  acting  on  the  directors  reinforce  these  incentives  to  serve
managers'  interests.  Moreover,  neither shareholder  pressure  nor market forces
have been able to effectively constrain managerial  influence over pay.
Managers have  used their power  to extract pay that is both higher and less
performance-sensitive  than  arm's-length  bargaining  with  the  board  would
produce.  The  difference  between  what  managers'  influence  enables  them  to
receive,  and what they would receive  under arm's-length bargaining,  is called
"rents."  The rents  captured by managers  come  in  both  the  form  of higher pay
and reduced pressure to generate value for shareholders.
However, managers'  ability to extract these rents is hardly unlimited. When
a  board  approves  a  compensation  arrangement  that  favors  managers  at  the
expense  of shareholders,  executives  and  directors may  bear certain  economic
and  social  costs.  Although  market  forces,  the  need  for  board  approval,  and
social  sanctions  do  not  altogether  prevent  deviations  from  arm's-length
contracting, they do, as we explain below, place  some constraints  on managers'
ability  to  obtain favorable  compensation  packages,  and the tightness  of these
constraints depends on outsiders'  perceptions  of these pay arrangements.
In  the face of these constraints,  how far firms will go in  favoring managers
will depend  not only  on how  much contemplated  arrangements  will  actually
favor  executives,  but  also  on  how  these  arrangements  will  be  perceived  by
outsiders.  Whether  directors  and managers  are deterred  from adopting a given
compensation arrangement depends on the extent to which it will be viewed by
3.  See Bebchuk  et a].,  Managerial  Power, supra note  1, at 764-783;  Bebchuk  &  Fried, Executive
Compensation, supra note  1, at 73-75;  BEBCHUK & FRIED,  PAY WITHOUT  PERFORMANCE,  supra note  1,
at ch. 2.
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relevant  outsiders as unjustified or even abusive or egregious. We have broadly
referred  to  negative  reactions  by  outsiders  as "outrage,"  even  though  some  of
them may amount to criticism not reaching the level of outrage, and to the costs
that such  reactions  impose  on managers  and directors  as "outrage  costs.'A The
more  widespread  and strong  these negative  reactions  are-that  is,  the greater
the outrage-the  larger the costs to directors and managers. When the potential
outrage  costs  are  large  enough,  they will  deter the  adoption  of arrangements
that  managers  would  otherwise  favor.  Arrangements  that  are  deterred  in  this
way can be regarded as ones that violate the "outrage constraint."
Why  should perceptions-and,  in  particular,  outrage-matter?  To  begin
with,  the  extent  to  which  markets  penalize  managers  and  directors  for  the
adoption  of particular  arrangements  depends  on how  these  arrangements  are
perceived. Consider the market for corporate control. This market may penalize
the adoption  of arrangements  by  increasing  the vulnerability of managers  and
directors  to a control  contest. Such  a penalty  is likely to  be significant  only if
the firm adopts compensation  arrangements that appear sufficiently outrageous.
Institutional  investors  may  view such  arrangements  as  a strong  signal that  the
executives  or directors are relatively insensitive to  shareholder interests. These
investors  may  become  less  likely  to  support  the  incumbents  should  a  hostile
takeover  or a proxy  fight occur.  In this manner,  through  the  operation  of the
market for corporate  control,  outrage over compensation  can impose  a penalty
on managers and directors.
Consider also the labor market and  the reputation of managers and directors
in this market. Reputational  damage might have  an adverse  effect on the future
career  prospects  of managers  and  directors.  It  might  also  affect  their  current
business  dealings  with  others  outside the firm.  Indeed,  some outside directors
join boards  partly for the prestige  and connections  that the posts provide,  and
gaining  a  bad  reputation  could  eliminate  these  benefits  and  impose  costs
instead. Reputational  losses to managers and directors  will likely be significant,
however,  only  if  their  firms  adopt  compensation  arrangements  that  generate
sufficiently negative reactions-that  is, sufficient outrage.  An arrangement  that
fails  to serve shareholders  would be unlikely to impose  such costs as  long as it
falls within the range of what is perceived as conventional and legitimate.
Indeed,  we  believe  that  arrangements  that  are  perceived  as  abusive  or
outrageous  impose  on executives greater costs than an analysis  based solely on
the  above  market  incentives  suggests.  That  is, we  believe  that constraints  on
rent  extraction  are  somewhat  tighter  than  suggested  by  an  analysis  of the
(limited) market penalties that outrageous  compensation arrangements  involve.
4.  See  Bebchuk  et at.,  Managerial  Power, supra note  1, at  786-88; Bebchuk  & Fried,  Executive
Compensation, supra note  1,  at 75-76;  BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY  WITHOUT  PERFORMANCE, supra note  1,
at ch. 5.Berkeley Business Law Journal
As  we  have explained  elsewhere,5  directors  are affected  not only by  "narrow"
interests  of a homo economicus, but  also by various  social and  psychological
factors (such as collegiality, loyalty, and so forth) that pull them in the direction
of favoring executives.  Similarly, there are social and psychological  factors that
increase  the  costs  that  managers  and  directors  incur  from  adopting
arrangements that are viewed by outsiders as sufficiently outrageous.
Managers and directors likely care about the extent to which relevant social
and  professional  groups  view  them  with  approval  and  esteem.  Directors  are
also likely to prefer to avoid criticism or ridicule from the social or professional
groups whose opinions they value---even  if such criticism or ridicule does  not
involve  any  economic  losses  for  them.6  As  a  result,  even  if the  economic
incentives  provided by the markets for corporate  control  and managerial  labor
would  be  insufficient  to  deter  managers  from  seeking  certain  outrageous
compensation,  fear of embarrassment  or criticism  could  discourage  managers
from doing so. When former General Electric  CEO Jack Welch made headlines
by  giving  up  much  of the  retirement  perks  to  which  he  was  contractually
entitled-including the  free use of a corporate jet and a New York apartment-
he  was undoubtedly  seeking to  protect the approval  and esteem he had earlier
enjoyed at the expense of his narrow economic interests.
7
Clearly,  for  outrage  to  impose  significant  costs,  it  must  be  sufficiently
widespread  among  a relevant group of observers.  It is not  enough for  a  small
group  of researchers  or  arbitrageurs  to  identify  a  compensation  scheme  as
egregiously bad  for  shareholders.  For executives  or  directors  to be  adversely
affected  in a material way by market penalties  or social costs,  the outrage must
be shared by those outsiders whose views matter most to them: the institutional
investor  community, the business media,  and social  and professional groups  to
which directors  and managers belong.
B. Camouflage
The  main  costs  to  directors  and  managers  of  adopting  compensation
arrangements that  favor managers,  then, depend mainly  not on how costly the
arrangements  actually  are to  shareholders, but on how costly the arrangements
are perceived  to be by important outsiders. Perceptions matter. This brings us to
another  concept  that is  critical for understanding  the  compensation  landscape:
camouflage.
Because perceptions  are  so important, the designers of compensation  plans
5.  See BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra  note  1, at ch.  2.
6.  JAY  W.  LORSCH  &  ELIZABETH  M.  MACIVER,  PAWNS  OR  POTENTATES?  TRE  REALITY  OF
AMERICA'S CORPORATE  BOARDS 23-31  (Harvard Business School  Press, 1989).
7.  See Matthew Brelis,  GE,  Welch Agree to Slash His Perks: Retired CEO  Will Retain Office, Staff,
Lose Many Benefits, BOSTON GLOBE,  Sept.  17, 2002, at D 1.
Vol.  1: No. 2, 2004Stealth Compensation  via Retirement Benefits
can  limit outside  criticism and  outrage  by dressing,  packaging,  or hiding-in
short,  camouflaging-rent  extraction.  The  more  reasonable  and defensible  a
package appears, the more rents managers can enjoy without facing significant
outrage.  Accordingly,  under  the  managerial  power  approach,  managers  will
prefer compensation  practices  that  obscure  the total  amount  of compensation,
that  appear  to  be  more  performance  based  than  they  actually  are,  and  that
package pay in ways that make it easier to justify and defend.
The  greater  the ability of plan designers  to engage in camouflage,  the more
they  can  be  expected  do  so.  Before  1992,  the  SEC  required  firms  to  report
executive compensation  to the public but allowed them to do so in the format of
their choosing. Not surprisingly, firms took full advantage of their discretion  to
obscure  the  amount and form  of their pay.  An  SEC  official describes  the  pre-
1992  state of affairs as follows:
The  information  [in  the  executive  compensation  section]  was  wholly
unintelligible ....  [T]he typical compensation  disclosure ran ten to fourteen pages.
Depending on the company's attitude  toward disclosure, you might get reference  to
a $3,500,081  pay  package  spelled  out  rather  than in  numbers.  That  gives you  an
idea  of the  nature  of  the  disclosures:  it  was  legalistic,  turgid,  and  opaque;  the
numbers were  buried somewhere  in the fourteen pages.  Someone once gave a series
of institutional  investor analysts  a proxy statement  and  asked them to compute  the
compensation  received  by  the  executives  covered  in  the proxy  statement.  No  two
analysts came  up with  the same  number.  The numbers  that were calculated  varied
widely.
8
In  1992,  the  SEC  tightened its disclosure rules  by providing  standards  for
how  information  about  executive  pay  must  be  presented.  The  standardized
compensation  tables  that  firms  now  must  use  have  made  camouflage  more
difficult. As we describe elsewhere, however, the  1992  disclosure  requirements
have  hardly brought  an  end  to  firms'  ability  to  camouflage  the  amount  and
form of executive pay.9
One  might  reasonably  ask  how,  if rent  extraction  is  camouflaged,  any
observer  (including  this  Article's  authors)  can  determine  that  executives  are
enjoying  rents.  In theory,  rent extraction could be  camouflaged  so well  that  it
becomes  absolutely  undetectable.  In  fact,  camouflage  is successful  as long  as
the  rent  extraction  is  not  apparent  to those  outside  observers  whose  outrage
would be particularly costly for directors and managers,  even if other observers
are aware that the executives are enjoying large rents.
Thus,  the  notion  of camouflage  is  consistent  with  the possibility  that  an
outsider might identify the hidden rents of a compensation  arrangement. Such a
conclusion  would  simply  reflect  the  observer's  judgment,  not  yet  widely
shared,  that  the  compensation  program  is  distorted  in  favor  of managers.  In
8.  Linda  C.  Quinn, Executive  Compensation  under the New  SEC Disclosure Requirements, 63  U.
CN. L. REv. 769,  770-71  (1995).
9.  See BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE,  supra note  1, at chs. 6-14.Berkeley Business Law Journal
time, of course, such conclusions might become widely accepted, in which case
the  rent  extraction  will  no  longer  be  camouflaged.  But a  given  form  of rent
extraction  might continue to  be camouflaged  long after it has been recognized
by some observers.
C. Outrage  and Camouflage  at Work
Some  critics of our earlier work argued  that the idea of outrage  costs, and
the related  idea of camouflage are  not empirically testable.'0 This, however, is
not  the  case.  There  is  evidence  that  directors  and  executives  are  indeed
influenced-in compensation  and other types  of decisions-by  strong outside
criticism and outrage. And there is evidence that they engage in camouflage.
To  begin with,  there is evidence  that  shareholder precatory resolutions  that
criticize  managers'  high  compensation  have  an  impact.  Although  such
resolutions are nonbinding and generally  fail to pass anyway,  their appearance
may  shine  a  critical  light  on  problematic  aspects  of  the  firm's  executive
compensation policies and make them  less opaque. Indeed, a study by Randall
Thomas  and  Kenneth  Martin  examined  the  effect  of  pay-related  precatory
resolutions  during  the  mid-1990s  and  found  that  they  had  a  moderating
influence on subsequent  compensation decisions." 1  The study found that during
the two-year period following the passage of shareholder  resolutions criticizing
executive pay  in particular firms,  total compensation  (adjusted for industry)  in
those  firms declined by  a statistically  significant  average of $2.7  million.  In a
subsequent  study,  the  researchers  also  found  that  higher  negative  votes  on
management-sponsored  proposals  to ratify  an option plan  slowed  the  increase
in CEO compensation  in subsequent years.12
Another  study,  by  Alexander  Dyck  and  Luigi  Zingales,  documents  the
effects of media  scrutiny on corporate decisions  in  general. The authors  found
that such attention leads firms to adopt more environmentally  friendly policies,
for example. As for issues of corporate  governance,  they also found that media
attention reduces the amount of value that controlling shareholders  siphon off.
13
A  well-known  example  of  how  outside  criticism  affects  governance
decisions  involves  the campaign of shareholder  activist Robert  Monks against
10.  See, e.g.,  Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation:  Managerial  Power versus the
Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69  U.  Ciii.  L.  REV.  847,  847-69  (2002);  Holman  W_  Jenkins,  Jr.,
Business World: Outrageous CEO Pay  Revisited, WALL  ST. J., Oct- 2, 2002, at A17.
11.  Randall  S.  Thomas  &  Kenneth  J. Martin,  The Effect  of Shareholder Proposals  on Executive
Compensation, 67  U. CIN. L. REV.  1021,  1021-65 (1999).
12.  Kenneth  J, Martin & Randall  S.  Thomas, When Is Enough, Enough? Market Reaction to Highly
Dilutive  Stock  Option  Plans and  the  Subsequent  Impact  on  CEO  Compensation,  J.  CORP.  FIN.
(forthcoming  2005).
13.  Alexander  Dyck  &  Luigi  Zingales,  The  Corporate  Governance  Role  of  the  Media  (2002)
(working paper, Harvard  Business School & University of Chicago);  Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales,
Private  Benefits of Control: An International  Comparison, 59 J. FIN.  537 (2004).
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the directors of Sears. During the late  1980s and  early 1990s,  Monks urged  the
Sears  board  to  adopt  various  proposals  to  improve  the  firm's  dismal
performance.  In  April  1992,  having  been  repeatedly  ignored  by  the  board,
Monks  took  out an  advertisement  in the  Wall Street Journal  titled "The  Non-
performing  Assets  of  Sears"  and  identified  the  directors  by  name.  The
presumably  embarrassed  directors  then  adopted  many  of Monks's  proposals,
generating  an abnormal  stock  price return  (the change  in  stock price  adjusted
for  overall  stock  market  movements)  of almost  10%  when  the  changes  were
announced. 14
Another  example  is  the  California  State  Pension  Fund  for  Public
Employees'  (CalPERS) practice of identifying poorly run companies. For some
years,  CaIPERS  put poorly performing  firms  on  what  it called  its "focus  list"
and suggested  various ways  to  improve  their corporate  governance  practices,
such as making compensation and nominating committees fully independent. In
many  cases,  firms  placed  on  the  list  implemented  some  of the  requested
changes.  Then,  in  1991,  after  several  CEOs  told  CalPERS  that  being  less
antagonistic  would  be  even  more  effective,  CalPERS  decided  to  adopt  a
"kinder,  gentler"  approach  that did  not  involve  public  shaming.15  Absent  the
threat  of  adverse  publicity,  however,  firms  approached  by  CalPERS  were
actually much less cooperative.  The then-CEO  of CalPERS, Dale Hanson, said
at the time, "It  has shown  us  that a number of companies  won't move unless
they  have  to  deal  with  the problem  because  it's in the  public eye."  In  1992,
CalPERS reinstated  its policy of publicly shaming uncooperative  firms.16
In  fact,  CalPERS'  policy  of  shaming  has  had  a  measurable  effect  on
targeted  corporations.  Yi-Lin  Wu  found  that  firms  put  on  CalPERS'  poor
governance  focus  list were  subsequently  more likely to reduce the  number  of
inside  directors  on  their  boards.  These  firms  were  also  more  likely  to
experience  CEO  turnover.
17 Shaming  also  appears to  have  adversely  affected
the  careers  of inside  directors  that left the  targeted  firms'  boards.  They  were
much  less likely than inside directors  departing nontargeted  firms  to land other
board  positions.
18 As this  study makes clear, negative publicity--or outrage-
does impose costs.
Finally,  and  perhaps  most  importantly,  there  is  substantial  evidence  of
camouflage  activities.  A  testable  implication  of the  camouflage  idea  is  that
14.  ROBERT MONKS  &  NELL MtNOW,  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE  399-411  (Blackwell  Publishers,
2d ed.,  2001).
15.  Judith  H. Dobrzynski,  CaIPERS Is Ready to Roar, but Will CEOs Listen?, BUS.  WK., Mar. 30,
1992,  at 44.
16.  Id.
17.  Yi-Lin  Wu,  The  Impact of Public Opinion on  Board Structure  Changes, Director Career
Progression, and CEO Turnover: Evidence from CaIPERS' Corporate Governance Program, 10  J.
CORP. FIN.  199 (2004).
18.  Id.Berkeley  Business Law Journal
when  compensation  arrangements  deviate  from  arm's-length  bargains,  they
should do  so in a way that makes the amount of pay or the  insensitivity of pay
to performance  less visible. This prediction is borne out by actual compensation
practices.  As  we  have  shown  elsewhere,  many  common  non-retirement
compensation  practices-such  as  company  loans  and  the  structure  of
conventional  options-provide  camouflage  benefits. 19 And as we  will explain
below,  the  four  channels  through  which  executives  are  paid after  retirement
also serve to obscure a significant amount of compensation.
III.  RETIREMENT  PENSIONS
Many  employees  are  covered  by pension  plans  that  provide  payments  to
workers  after  retirement.  At  first  glance,  it  seems  only  natural  for  firms  to
provide such benefits to their executives. A closer look, however, raises serious
questions  about whether  the extensive  use of executive  pensions as  a form of
compensation  reflects  arm's-length  bargaining.  Part  III.A  describes  the
difference  between  executive  retirement  pensions  and the  retirement  benefits
offered to ordinary workers. Part III.B explains how the executive pensions are
used to camouflage  a  substantial  amount of performance-decoupled  executive
pay.
A.  Differences  from Regular  Pensions
Most  of  the  pension  plans  used  for  employees  are  designed  to  be
"qualified"  for favorable  tax treatment.  The firm  gets a current  deduction  for
contributing  funds  to  a  qualified  plan  for employees-the  same  deduction  it
would have  received had  it paid the  amount  of the contribution  to workers  in
the form of salary. Workers, however,  do not  pay income taxes on the pension
money  until  they  retire  and  begin  receiving  payouts  from  the  plan.  In  the
meantime,  the funds  invested by  the  firm  grow tax-free.  Neither the  firm nor
the  employees  must  pay any  taxes  while  the  plan's  investments  increase  in
value.  Thus,  the  plans  provide  a tax  benefit  to  employees  at no  cost  to the
firm.
2 0
19.  See BEBCHUK  AND  FRIED,  PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE,  supra  note  1, at chs.  9-14.
20.  To illustrate  how the  tax  subsidy provided to  a qualified  plan operates,  consider the following
examples  involving  a hypothetical  firm  and employee.  Assume  that both  face a 40% tax rate on  all of
their income,  including capital gains. Also assume that both are  able to earn, between the pre-retirement
period and retirement  period, a pretax return of 100%  on their investments.
Example  1:  The  employee  invests  for  retirement outside  a  qualified  plan.  Suppose  the  firm pays  the
employee  $100 in the pre-retirement period. The firm deducts  $100  from its taxable  income, reducing its
tax  liability by $40. The  employee  pays $40 in taxes, takes the  after-tax  income of $60, and  invests it.
The $60  grows to $120 by the retirement period-a gain of $60. This $60  gain triggers a tax  liability of
$24 (40% of $60),  leaving the employee with $96 ($60 + $36) when the employee retires.
Example 2: The firm invests for the employee's retirement  under a qualified plan. Now suppose the firm
contributes  the  $100  to  a qualified pension  plan in  the pre-retirement  period. The  firm  again deducts
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Given  the  opportunity,  boards  might  well  prefer  to  offer  executives
qualified  retirement  plans.  A  qualified  pension  plan,  however,  can  use  only
about  $200,000 of annual  compensation  as  the basis  for determining  benefits
under the plan. For example,  a plan  that promises to pay  all retirees,  annually,
50% of the  compensation earned  during their last year of service cannot pay a
retired executive more  than $100,000  annually, even if the executive  earned $1
million of compensation  during  that  final  year.  As  a result,  firms  cannot  use
qualified  plans to provide  executives  with pensions  that  are  similar  in size  to
their annual  compensation.  For this reason, most firms  also provide  executives
with nonqualified "supplemental"  executive retirement plans (SERPs). 21
SERPs  differ  from  typical  qualified  pension  plans  in  two  critical  ways.
First,  they  do  not  receive  the  favorable  tax  treatment  enjoyed  by  qualified
plans;  no  investment  income  goes untaxed  under  a SERP.  The  company  pays
taxes on the income it must generate  in order to pay the executive in retirement.
If the  money had been  distributed  as  salary,  on  the other  hand,  the  executive
who  invested  the  money for retirement  would  have  had to  pay  taxes on  any
income  generated.  The effect  of the  SERP,  therefore,  is  to  shift  some  of the
executive's  tax burden to the firm.
2 2
If the employee and the firm are  subject to the same  tax rate and are able to
earn  the same pretax rate of return  on their investments,  a SERP cannot reduce
the total  amount of taxes paid by the  parties. For every dollar the  employee's
tax burden is reduced, the firm's tax burden is increased by one  dollar. Unlike a
qualified plan, the SERP would not reduce the parties'  total tax burden.23
$100  from  its taxable  income, reducing  its tax liability by  $40. The  $100  grows to  $200 by the time of
the employee's  retirement-a  gain of$ 100.  The $200 is  distributed to the employee,  who  pays a  tax of
$80  (40%  of $200),  leaving the  employee with  $120,  or  $24  more than  in  Example  1, in  which  the
employee  had  received  SIO  from the firm  in the  pre-retirement  period  and saved  for retirement. The
gain to  the  employee does  not  come  at the expense  of the  employer:  in  both  examples, the  employer
incurs an aftertax  cost of $60 in the pre-retirement period.
21.  Clark  Consulting  reports  that  approximately  70  percent  of  responding  firms  use  SERPs.
Executive Benefits: A  Survey of Current Trends: 2003  Results, Clark Consulting,  (Clark  Consulting,
North  Barrington,  IL),  Jan.  2004,  at  1,  available  at
http://www.clarkconsulting.com/knowledgecenter/articles/benefits/iOthannualsurvey.doc  (last  visited
Nov.  11, 2004) [hereinafter Clark Consulting].
22.  A  firm  can  shelter  from  taxation  the  investment  income  on  funds  set  aside  for  financing
executive pensions  by investing these  funds in life insurance policies on the lives  of its  executives and
other  employees.  However,  because  of the fees that  must  be paid to the  insurance  company, this  tax-
sheltering  mechanism  involves  significant  costs,  which  are  borne  by  the  company  rather  than  the
executive. If, on the other hand, the executive received the funds to begin with, the executive  would also
be able to shelter the  investment returns from taxation by purchasing a variable annuity, at no cost to  the
company.
23-  To  illustrate  the  effect of a  SERP  on  the tax  burdens  of the  parties,  consider  the  following
example and explanation,  which builds on the examples provided in note 20. Assume again that both the
firm and  the executive  face a 40%  tax rate on all  of their income, including  capital  gains. And  assume
that both are able to earn, between the pre-retirement and retirement periods,  a pretax return of 100%  on
their  investments.
Example  3: The  firm invests  for the  executive's  retirement under  a nonqualified  plan.  Suppose a firm
seeks  to  use  a SERP  to  give  an  executive  the same  retirement  payment  that  it  gives the  employee  inBerkeley  Business Law Journal
In reality, of course, the situation is more complicated. 24 In  many cases, the
total tax  liability faced.by  the parties will be affected by whether  the executive
or  the  firm  saves  for  the  executive's  retirement.  Even  if  the  firm  and  the
executive  are able to earn the  same return on their investments,  they may  face
different  tax  rates.  Suppose, for example,  that an executive  investing  personal
funds for retirement in the stock market  is paying a low long-term capital-gains
tax  rate  of  15%,  while  the  firm  pays  taxes  on  the  income  generated  for  the
executive's  retirement  at  a corporate  tax  rate of 35%.  In  such  a case,  using
SERPs would be  tax-inefficient and would  increase the total amount  of taxes
paid by the  two parties. On  the other hand, if the firm  had no taxable earnings
and  was  not  expected  to  pay  taxes  for  a  considerable  amount  of time,  the
reverse might be true:  shifting retirement savings from the executive to the  firm
might be tax-efficient.25
Similarly,  even if the  firm  and the  executive  face  the  same  tax rate,  the
investment  returns  available  to the  firm may be higher  than those  available to
the executive.  For example,  firms having difficulty raising capital may enjoy  a
higher  expected  rate of return  on  new  investments  than  the  market  generally.
(This  is  unlikely  to be the case  for  companies  with  easy  access to  capital,  as
such companies  are  unlikely to have unutilized investments  with returns  much
higher than the market.)  If the firm has better investment  opportunities,  having
example  2 using  a qualified  plan.  As  in the case of the employee,  the  firm sets aside $100  to  fund the
executive's  pension,  which grows  to $200 by  the time the executive  retires. The  $200  is distributed to
the executive, who, like  the employee,  pays a 40% tax on the retirement distribution-a tax  of $80. This
leaves  the  executive,  like  the  employee  in  example  2,  with  $120,  $24  more  than  the  employee  in
example  1 made.
Now  consider the effect  of the SERP  on  the firm.  In  examples  I and 2,  discussed  in note 2,  the firm
reduces  its  tax liability by $40 in the pre-retirement period when  it pays  the worker $100  or contributes
$100  to the worker's  qualified pension plan.  In example  3, the firm  reduces  its tax liability by $80  in the
retirement period when it pays the executive  $200. However,  the firm must add  to its taxable  income in
the retirement  period the $100  gain  on the funds  it previously  invested  for the executive's  retirement,
and this increases the  firm's tax liability  in  the retirement  period  by $40. The  net  effect of the $200
payment  to the  executive  and  the  $100  gain is  to  reduce  the  firm's  tax  liability  by  $40  during  the
retirement period.
Had  the  firm  reduced  its  tax  liability  by  $40  in  the  pre-retirement  period,  rather  than  during  the
retirement  period,  it  could  have  invested the  $40  and  earned  a  pretax  return  of $40  (100%)  by  the
retirement  period.  That  $40 would  also  have  been  taxed  at  40%,  leaving  the  firm  with  $64.  But by
reducing  its tax  liability in the retirement  period, the  firm has  only an extra  $40,  $24  less.  The firm  is
thus worse off than in  example  2,  in which  it received  the same  $40 reduction in  its tax  liability  in  the
pre-retirement period. The $24 gain to the executive from the use of a nonqualified plan designed to  put
the  executive  in  the  same position  as  an  employee  under  a  qualified  retirement  plan  comes  at  the
expense of the firm.
24.  For  an  explanation  of  the  tax  effects  of  using  arrangements  such  as  SERPs  to  defer
compensation  under  various  scenarios,  see  MYRON  S.  SCHOLES  ET  AL.,  TAXES  AND  BUSINESS
STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH  181-185  (Prentice Hall, 2d ed., 2002).
25.  The tax  efficiency  of a  SERP will  also be  affected by  expected  changes  in  the  firm's (or the
executive's) tax rate change over time. For example,  if the firm is losing money and thus unable to get a
current  tax  benefit  by  deducting  executive  compensation  in  the  current  period,  but  is  expected  to  be
subject to a higher tax rate  in the future,  deferring an executive's  compensation  will  be tax efficient, all
else being equal.
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it invest for the  executive's retirement  will be efficient for both parties, even  if
their tax rates are  identical.
However,  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that,  absent  a  tax  subsidy,  it  is
generally  efficient  to  have  the  firm  save  for  the  executive.  On the  contrary,
there are  good  reasons  to think  that it is inefficient for many firms  to save  for
their executives'  retirement, given individuals'  low long-term  capital-gains  tax
rate.  It  is  telling  that  firms  providing  SERPs  to  executives  do  not  offer
nonqualified retirement plans to other employees. Consider the case where it is
efficient  for a  firm to  provide  a SERP  to  its executives  because  the  firm  has
better  investment opportunities  than  they do.  In  such  a case,  it should also  be
efficient  for  the  firm  to  provide  nonqualified  retirement  to  its  nonexecutive
employees  who  supplement  their  qualified  pensions  with personal  retirement
savings.  However,  firms  rarely,  if ever, do  so.  This  fact  suggests  that,  absent
the  tax  subsidy  provided  to  qualified  plans,  using  nonqualified  retirement
benefits  is  commonly  not  an  efficient way  to  compensate  employees.  Yet  in
2002,  more  than  70%  of  firms  provided  nonqualified  SERPs  to  their
26 executives.
The  second  important  difference  between executive  SERPs  and  qualified
pension  plans  for nonexecutive  employees  concerns  the risk borne by the  firm
and  by  the  participant.  Qualified  pension  plans  offered  to  new  lower-level
employees  are  usually based on  a defined contribution.  The  firm  commits  to
contribute  a  specified  amount each  year.  The value  available  to an  employee
upon retirement depends on the performance of the plan's investments. The risk
of poor investment performance  falls entirely on the employee.
In contrast,  SERPs  offered  to  executives  are  defined-benefit plans,  which
guarantee  fixed payments to the executive for life.  All of the  CEOs in the  S&P
ExecuComp  database  have defined-benefit  plans.  These plans  shift the risk of
investment  performance  entirely  to  the  firm  and  its  shareholders.  No  matter
how poorly the firm and its investments  perform, the executive is guaranteed  a
specified lifelong stream of payments.
Given that arm's-length negotiations  with most employees  lead to defined-
contribution  arrangements,  why  should  arm's-length  bargaining  with
executives yield such a different result? If anything, there are reasons to believe
that defined-benefit  plans should be more valuable  to regular employees-and
thus offer a more efficient  form  of compensation-than they  are to executives.
Unlike  most  executives,  ordinary  employees  are  unlikely  to  accumulate
substantial wealth over their lifetimes. They are likely to be more dependent on
their pensions to meet their financial needs in retirement and therefore less able
26.  See Clark Consulting, supra note  21.
27.  STEVEN  BALSAM,  AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  EXECUTIVE  COMPENSATION  175  (Academic  Press,
2002).Berkeley Business Law Journal
to  bear  the  investment  risks  associated  with  defined-contribution  plans.  In
contrast,  executives. faced with defined-contribution  plans  could  easily  insure
themselves  against poor investment performance by using some of their already
high salaries and option-based  compensation  to buy  fixed annuities that  would
provide them with  guaranteed payments.  If only one of the two  groups were  to
receive  defined-benefit  plans,  arm's-length  contracting  would  predict  that
group to be nonexecutive employees, not executives.
B. Camouflage Benefits
Although  the  efficiency  benefits  of  providing  executives  with  defined-
benefit  SERPs  are  far  from  clear,  such  plans  do  considerably  reduce  the
visibility of a substantial amount of performance-insensitive  compensation.
SERP  payments  are  usually  based  on  years of service  and  pre-retirement
cash  compensation. The higher the  executive's salary and the longer the period
of  employment,  the  higher  the  payout.  SERP  payments-like  salary-are
therefore largely decoupled from the executive's own performance.  Many firms
have  also credited executives with years they did not actually serve,  ratcheting
up the final payout under the plan's formula.
29
In their annual public filings,  firms must publish a  summary compensation
table indicating the dollar value of different forms  of compensation received by
the  current  CEO  and  the  four other highest-paid  executives  of the  firm.  The
numbers  in  these  tables  are  the  most  visible  indicators  of  executive
compensation  in  public  firms.  They  are  easily  accessible  to  the  media  and
others reading the  public  filings. Indeed,  the  standard  databases  of executive
compensation,  which are used by both financial  economists and  compensation
consultants,  are based on these numbers.
If an executive's  pensions  were  structured  as  a defined  contribution  plan,
the firm's annual contributions to the executive's  account would be reported in
the summary  compensation  table.  An important camouflage  benefit of SERPs
is that the annual increase in the present value of an executive's  defined benefit
plan--due to pay raises  and the addition of another  year of service-is largely
hidden from view:  firms are not required to include this increase in value in the
compensation  tables.  A person  examining  the  compensation  tables  would not
see the steady buildup in value of an executive's  SERP.
Furthermore,  and  importantly,  disclosure  requirements  require  firms  to
include  in  their  summary  compensation  tables  only  amounts  paid  to  their
current executives.  Because the executives are  no longer employed by the firm
when  the  pension payments  begin,  the  payments  need  not  be  included  in  the
published tables. Thus, the value of an executive's defined-benefit  SERP never
28.  See, e.g.,  Mike  Blahnik,  A Credit for Work Not Served;  Years Added to Pensions as Part  of
Executives'Job Perks, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May  18, 2003, at  IA.
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appears  in  the  place  where  the  media  and  researchers  collect  most  of their
information about executive compensation.  In addition, because the value of an
executive's  pension payouts  is obscured, the  performance  insensitivity of such
payments also gets little notice.
Consider a  situation  in which  a  CEO serves  a company  for ten years  and
then  receives  annually,  for life,  a  payment that  equals  a  large  fraction  of the
salary earned  during the  last year of service.  In  such  a case,  the total  value  of
the  pension  payments  may  in  the  end  exceed  the  total  value  of  the  salary
received during the  CEO's  actual  tenure. Unlike the salary  amounts, however,
the value  of the  pension  payments  will  never  appear  in  the  firm's  published
compensation tables.
For example,  when IBM CEO Louis Gerstner retired after about  nine years
of service,  he  was  entitled  to  a  $1,140,000  annual  pension  beginning  at age
sixty.29 The actuarial  value of this annuity was of a similar  order of magnitude
as the approximately  $18  million in salary  he received  during his nine years  as
CEO. IBM,  however,  was not required to  include  the pension  in the  summary
compensation table or even place a dollar value on it.
30
Not  surprisingly,  SERP  plans  are  designed  and  marketed  specifically  as
ways to increase compensation "off the radar screen of shareholders."31  Indeed,
according  to  media  reports,  some  directors  have  voted  to  adopt  SERPs  only
after  being reassured  that  the  amounts involved  do  not have  to be  reported  to
the public.32
To be sure,  although neither the increase  in value of the  SERP plan before
retirement  nor  the  amount  of  payments  after  retirement  appears  in  the
compensation  tables,  the  existence  of SERPs,  and  the  formulas  under  which
payouts  are  made,  must  be  disclosed  in  the  firm's  SEC  filings.33  But  it  is
29.  See International  Business Machines, SEC Filing  14A, Definitive  Proxy Statement,  18,  Mar.  12,
2001,  available at  http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/51143/000100547701001864/0001005477-
01-001864-indexhtm (last visited Nov.  14, 2004).
30.  To take another  example,  GE's former CEO,  Jack Welch,  left  his firm with an annual pension
of almost  $10  million.  See Paul  Hodgson,  The Corporate  Library,  Golden Parachutes  and Cushioned
Landings,  in  The  Corporate  Library,  Feb.  I,  2003,  at  14,  available  at,
http://www.thecorporatelibrary.comnProducts-and-Services/store/publications/default.asp  (last  visited
Nov.  14, 2004). The  large actuarial value of the  stream of promised pension payments never appeared  in
the firm's compensation tables.
31.  Liz  Pulliam Weston, Despite Recession, Perks for Top Executives Grow, Pay: Hidden Benefits
Mushroom as Employees'  Retirement Plans Shrink, L.A. TIMES,  Feb.  1, 2002,  at A]  (quoting  Cynthia
Riehson).
32.  The Star Tribune reported  that the  HealthPartners board  adopted  a  SERP  for  the CEO  "after
receiving assurances  that the  supplemental  retirement  plan wouldn't  have to  be  reported to the  public"
and  "rejecting  a suggestion  that  awards  in  the  plan be tied to company  performance."  Glenn  Howatt,
HealthPartners  Ex-CEO Reaped Board's Favors; Secret Deals Contributed to $5,5 Million Package,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),  Jan.  17, 2003,  at IA.
33.  In addition,  firms are required to file  a letter with  the Labor Department  indicating the  number
of executive pension  plans and  the  number  of participants.  However,  not  all  firms  comply  with  this
requirement.  Ellen E.  Schultz, Big Send-Off. As  Firms Pare Pensions for Most, They  Boost  Those for
Executives, WALL  ST. J., June 20, 2001,  at Al.Berkeley Business  Law Journal
difficult  for  anyone  without  actuarial  or  financial  training  to  estimate  with
precision  the  value-and  thus  the  cost  to  the  company-of  these  future
payments. 34 As  noted  above,  firms  are  not required  to  supply,  and usually  do
not provide, any estimate of the dollar value of a particular executive's  defined-
benefit  pension plan.  The  lack of easy  access  to the monetary values  of these
substantial  benefits  presumably  explains  their  absence  from  the  standard
databases used for research on executive compensation.
Indeed,  it  is often difficult even  to  figure out  the total  SERP liability of a
firm  with  respect to  its  executives  as  a  group.  A  firm  must  report  only  one
figure:  the  sum  of the  liabilities  associated  with  all  of its  employee  pension
plans  that are  "unfunded"  or "underfunded"  (that  is, plans  for which  the  firm
does  not  have  assets  set  aside  to  cover  the  plans'  liabilities  fully).35  The
Financial  Accounting  Standards Board  (FASB)  does not require  that  liabilities
associated  with SERPs  be itemized separately.36 Thus, firms can  simply report
one  number  that  represents  all  the  liabilities  associated  with  underfunded
qualified plans and unfunded SERPs.
Although  they  are  not  required  to  do  so,  some  firms  do  report  the  total
obligations  arising under SERPs. These  figures  can be staggering.  In 2000, for
example, GE reported  a $1.13  billion pension liability for all of its executives.37
Unfortunately,  GE  did  not  report  what  portion  of  this  amount  was  due
specifically  to its CEO and other top executives. Most companies  do not even
break down  pension liabilities  into separate categories for executives  and other
employees.
It is worth noting at least one way in which executives'  plans may not be as
advantageous  to  their  beneficiaries  as  the  plans  of lower-level  employees.
Finns using  qualified  plans  are  required,  as  a  condition  for  favorable  tax
treatment,  to  set aside  assets  to ensure that they  can  pay their liabilities under
the  plans.  Given  that  executives'  SERP  plans  would  not  qualify  for  the
favorable  tax  treatment  even  if they  were  so  funded,  firms  do  not  bother
funding SERP plans. Executives'  retirement benefits are  thus at greater risk of
nonpayment  than  the  benefits  of  ordinary  workers-and  Congress  is
considering  legislation  that  would  make  it  difficult  for  firms  to  shelter
executives  from this risk.38
34.  See Joann  S.  Lublin, Executive Pay (A Special  Report): Under the Radar, WALL  ST. J., Apr. 11,
2002, at B7; Anne Fisher, Proxies: The Treasure  Is Still Buried, FORTUNE,  June 8,  1998,  at 285.
35.  EMPLOYERS'  DISCLOSURE  ABOUT  PENSIONS  AND OTHER  POSTRETIREMENT  BENEFITS, Statement
of Financial  Accounting  Standards  No.  132,  B21 (Financial  Accounting  Standards  Bd.  2003),  § 36
available  at http://www.fasb.org/fas132r.pdf  (last visited Nov.  1I,  2004).
36.  EMPLOYERS'  ACCOUNTING  FOR  PENSIONS,  Statement  of Financial  Accounting  Standards  No.
87,  (Financial  Accounting  Standards  Bd.  1985), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas87.pdf  (last
visited Nov.  11,  2004).
37.  Schultz, supra note 33.
38.  In  June  2004,  the U.S.  House  of Representatives  passed  the American  Jobs  Creation  Act of
2004,  which  penalizes  firms  using certain  types  of trusts  to protect  deferred  compensation  from  the
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In the  past, however,  firms facing financial  problems have often purchased
insurance  policies  that  guaranteed  payment  of executive  retirement  benefits,
transferred  the money to a designated trust, or taken other steps to guarantee  the
benefits against  insolvency.39 Delta Airlines,  for example, set  up an executive-
protecting arrangement  shortly after September  11,  2001,  when the solvency  of
40 the  airline  industry  appeared  to  be  in  danger.  Although  putting  the  money
beyond the reach of the firm's creditors triggers a tax liability for the executive,
firms often "gross  up" the payment to cover part or all of that liability.41 It was
reported  in  1991  that  approximately  fifty  major  companies  had  set  up  fully
guaranteed  executive pension plans.42  This practice may have been much  more
widespread;  many  firms,  fearing  criticism  that  they  are  insulating  managers
from the  effects of their own failures, have failed  to announce  the existence  of
such guarantees.43
IV. DEFERRED COMPENSATION
Deferred compensation  is a second technique used to transfer large amounts
of mostly performance-insensitive  value  to executives  without attracting  much
shareholder  attention.  Many  firms  offer  programs  that  permit  executives,  or
sometimes  even  require  them,  to  defer  receipt  of compensation  until  some
future  date. In the meantime, the deferred compensation "builds"  according to a
formula  devised  by  the  firm.  Executives  do  not  pay  taxes  on  the  original
compensation  or  on  the  accumulated  increase  until  they  receive  payment,
which often occurs after they leave the company. At that time,  the firm takes a
tax  deduction  for the  amount  paid.  Most  large  companies  have  plans  of this
kind.
44
Deferred compensation  plans  can take  different forms. Some  firms require
that managers receiving  salary  in excess of $1 million, which would otherwise
be nondeductible under Section  162(m) of the Internal Revenue  Code, defer the
excess.  Other  firms  have  purely  elective  plans.  Some  arrangements  permit
firms'  creditors.  The U.S.  Senate  passed  a similar  bill  in  May  2004,  which was  signed by  President
Bush on October 22, 2004.
39.  Clark/Bardes  Consulting reported  in 2001  that  86%  of firms surveyed  use security  devices to
protect SERPs  to the  greatest extent possible. Clark/Bardes  Consulting, Executive Benefits: A Survey of
Current  Trends  - 2001  Results,  J.  DEFERRED  COMP.,  33,  available  at
http://www.clarkconsulting.eom/knowledgecenter/articles/benefits/20020305.pdf  (last  visited  Nov.  15,
2004);  Ron  Suskind, More Executives Get Pension Guarantees  to Protect against Takeovers, Failures,
WALL  ST.  J.,  Jul.  5,  1991,  at  BI;  Theo  Francis  &  Ellen  Schultz,  As  Workers  Face Pension Cuts,
Executives Get Rescued, WALL  ST. J.,  Apr. 3,  2003, at C1.
40.  Francis & Schultz, supra  note 39,
41.  Id.
42.  Suskind, supra  note  39.
43.  Id.
44.  Clark Consulting  reports  that close to 93%  of firms  responding to  a  survey  said they had  such
plans in 2002. Clark Consulting, supra note  21.Berkeley Business Law Journal
deferral of salary only,  while  others also  allow  deferral of long-term  incentive
compensation  and gains from the exercise  of stock options  or from the  sale of
restricted stock. Companies frequently provide matching contributions,  with the
amounts  varying  from  firm  to  firm.  At  some  companies,  contributions  are
awarded at the board's discretion. At others, they are determined by formulas.
45
Plans  also differ  in  how  the  deferred  compensation  is "invested,"  that  is,
how  the  amount  owed  to  the  executive  at the  end  of the  deferral  period  is
determined.  Many  companies  provide  a  guaranteed  rate  of  return  (or  a
guaranteed  minimum  rate)  on  the  funds.46  Firms  have  often  granted  extra
benefits  to  executives  by  providing  rates  of return  that  are  higher  than  the
market  rate.  For  example,  in  2001,  at  a  time  when  one-year  Treasury  bills
offered returns of 3.39% to 4.63%, both GE and Enron guaranteed  executives a
12%  rate  of return.  Other  firms have  offered a market  return  plus a  premium.
For example,  Lucent has offered  the  return  on the  ten-year Treasury  bill plus
5%.47  Congress  is now  considering legislation  aimed at preventing  firms from
providing executives with above-market returns  in their deferred-compensation
plans. Although  the adoption of such legislation would eliminate  this particular
benefit  to  managers,  deferred  compensation  plans  would  still  provide
executives  with  significant  other  financial  and  camouflage  advantages  as  we
discuss below. Part IV.A  identifies  the differences  between  executive deferred
compensation  arrangements  and  the 401(k)  plans offered  to  other  employees.
Part  IV.B  describes  the  camouflage  benefits  of  executive  deferred
compensation arrangements.
A. Differences  from 401(k) Plans
Deferred-compensation  arrangements  appear  analogous  to  the  familiar
401(k)  plans  used  by  many  employees.  But, just as  SERPs  differ  from the
qualified  retirement  plans offered  to  lower-level  employees,  there  are  some
important  differences  between  executives'  deferred  compensation  and 401(k)
plans.
To begin with, the 401(k) plans give workers  an opportunity  to put money
in designated investment  instruments; whatever the investments, employees  get
the same pretax returns they would receive by investing in similar instruments
outside  the  401(k)  plan.  In  contrast,  executives'  deferred-compensation
arrangements  often provide higher returns than those available in the market.
In addition, 401(k) plans are  given a tax subsidy, while executive deferred-
45.  For example,  when Sears, Roebuck & Co. executives postpone bonuses and long-term  incentive
pay, they receive  an  additional  contribution  equal to 20%  of the amount  deferred. Ellen  E.  Schultz &
Theo  Francis, Buried Treasure: Well-Hidden Perk Means Big Money for Top Executives, WALL ST.  J.,
Oct.  11,  2002, at A1,  A9.
46.  Weston, supra note 31.
47.  Lublin, supra note 34; Weston, supra  note 31.
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compensation  plans are not. Under  a 401(k) plan, a fraction of the employee's
salary  is placed  in a tax-deferred  account. The firm may also  make a separate
contribution to the account. As in a qualified retirement arrangement,  the funds
are invested and grow tax-free. Neither the firm nor the employee pays taxes on
the  income  and capital  gain generated  in the  account.  Employees  do  not  pay
taxes  on  the  contributions  or the  increase  until they withdraw  the  funds.  The
employer,  on the  other hand, gets  a deduction  for both its contribution  and the
employee's contribution to the 401(k) plan. By placing current compensation in
a  401(k)  account,  the employee  gains  the  benefit  of tax deferral  without the
employer's loss of a tax deduction.48
Firms  could  provide  deferred  compensation  to  executives  through 401(k)
plans.  However,  there  are  limits  on  how  much  money  can  be  contributed
annually  to  a  401(k) account.  For the  tax  year 2004,  employees  covered  by
such  a  plan  ordinarily  cannot  defer more  than  $13,000  of compensation. 49 In
order to provide executives  with amounts exceeding  this limit, firms implement
deferred-compensation  arrangements  outside  the tax-advantaged  framework  of
401(k) plans.  Executives'  deferred  compensation  is therefore  not based solely,
or even primarily, on 401(k) plans.
Rather  than  contribute  a  portion  of the  executive's  compensation  to  an
account where the investment grows tax-free, the firm simply withholds part of
the  executive's  pay  and  credits  the  executive  each  year  with  a  prespecified
return  on  the  money,  allowing  it  to  "grow"  over  time.  The  withheld
compensation,  along  with the appreciation  credited to it by the firm, is paid to
the executive at a later date.
The company  pays taxes on the income  it must generate  in order to pay the
executive the  promised buildup  of the deferred  compensation.  If, on  the  other
48.  To  illustrate  how  the  tax  subsidy  provided  to  a  401(k)  operates,  consider  the  following
examples  involving  a  hypothetical  firm  and  employee.  As  in  the  SERP  examples  found  in  note  20
(examples  I and  2),  assume that  both  the  firm  and the  employee  face  a  40%  tax  rate  on  all  of their
income.  Assume also that  both are  able to earn,  between  the pre-retirement  and retirement periods,  a
pretax return of 100%  on their investments.
Example  4:  The employee  saves outside the  401(k) plan.  Suppose the firm  pays the  employee $100  in
the  pre-retirement  period. The  firm  deducts $100  from its taxable  income,  reducing  its tax liability  by
$40.  The  employee  pays  $40  in  taxes,  and  invests  the  aftertax  income  of  $60  in  an  ordinary,
nonqualified investment account.  By the retirement period, the $60 grows to $120-a gain of $60. The
employee pays a tax of $24 on the gain (40% of $60), leading to an  aftertax gain of $36.  The employee
is thus able to withdraw a total of $96  ($60 + $36).
Example  5:  The employee  saves  under a 401(k) plan. Now  suppose that the employee  contributes  $100
of compensation  income  to  a 401(k)  account.  The  firm  again  deducts  $100  from  its taxable income,
reducing its  tax liability by $40. The  $100  grows to $200 by  the time the employee withdraws the funds
from  the 401(k) account.  The employee  pays  a tax  of $80  (40% of $200),  leaving the  employee  with
$120-$24  more  than  in  example  4,  where  the  employee  received  $100  from  the  firm  in  the
preretirement  period and  saved  the money outside  the 401(k) plan.  The $24 gain  to  the employee does
not come  at the  expense of the employer. In both examples, the employer pays the employee $100  in the
pre-retirement  period, thereby reducing  its taxable income by $100 and its tax liability by $40.
49.  I.R.C.  § 402(g)(l)(B).Berkeley Business Law Journal
hand, the  deferred  compensation  had  been  distributed  when  it was  originally
owed  the  executive,  the  executive  would  have  invested  the  money  and paid
taxes  on  any  income  or capital  gains  subsequently generated.  Thus,  as in  the
case of a SERP, the effect of executive deferred  compensation  is to shift some
of the executive's tax burden to the  firm.
5 0
If the employee and the firm are subject to the same tax rate and are able to
earn  the  same  pretax  rate of return  on  their  investments,  executive  deferred
compensation,  like a  SERP, cannot reduce  the parties' joint tax  burden. While
every  dollar  of deferred  compensation  lowers  the  executive's  taxes,  it  boosts
the  firm's  taxes by  one  dollar. Like  a  SERP,  and unlike  qualified 401(k)  and
retirement  plans,  deferred-compensation  plans for  executives  provide  no  tax-
efficiency  benefit when the firm  and the  executive share  the same tax  rate and
investment opportunities.
51
As  in  the  case  of SERPs,  of course,  there  will  be  many  cases in  which
deferred  compensation  outside  401(k)  plans  can  increase  or  reduce  the  total
amount of value  available  to  the  executive  and  the  firm. 2  The  firm  and  the
executive may face  different  tax rates.  Even if the  firm and the executive  face
50.  A  company  can  shelter  from  taxation  investment  income  on  funds  set  aside  for  financing
executive pensions by investing  these funds in insurance policies on the lives of its executives  and other
employees, but this will impose other costs  on the firm. See  SCHOLES  ET AL.,  supra note 24, at 181-85.
51.  To illustrate  the effect  of executive deferred-compensation  arrangements  on the tax  burdens of
the parties, consider the following  example and explanation,  which  refer to examples 4  and 5 provided
in note 48.
Example  6:  The  firm  offers the executive  deferred  compensation  outside a 401(k)  plan. Assume,  as  in
examples  4  and  5,  that  both  the  firm  and  the  executive  face  a  40%  tax  rate on  all  of their  income,
including capital gains.  And assume that both are able to  earn, between  the pre-retirement and retirement
periods,  a pretax return of 100%  on their investments.
Suppose  the firm seeks to use deferred compensation to give an executive  the same (100%)  return that
the firm  provides  the employee in  example  5 using a 401(k) plan.  As  in the case  of the employee,  the
firm  sets  aside  $100,  which  grows  to  $200  by  the  time  the  executive  withdraws  the  deferred
compensation  and the buildup  credited to the designated amount of deferred  compensation.  The $200 is
distributed  to  the  executive.  Like  the  employee,  the  executive  pays  40%  tax  on  the  retirement
distribution-a  tax of $80. This  leaves the executive,  like the employee in example  5,  with $120,  or $24
more than the employee saving on his own ended up with in example 4.
Now,  let us consider the effect  of the executive's  deferred  compensation  arrangement  on the  firm.  In
examples  4 and  5,  the firm reduces its  tax  liability by $40 in  the pre-retirement period  when  it pays  the
worker $100  or contributes $100  to the worker's qualified pension  plan. In  example 6, the firm reduces
its tax  liability by $80 in the retirement period when it pays the executive  $200. However, the firm must
add to its taxable income in the retirement period the $100 generated to  boost the executive's  withdrawal
payout  from $100  to $200-which in turn increases the firm's tax  liability by $40. The net effect of the
$100  gain and the $200  payment to the executive  is to reduce the firm's tax  liability by $40 during  the
retirement period. The  firm is  thus worse off than  in example 2,  where it received the same reduction in
its tax  liability in the pre-retirement period.
Had the  firm reduced its  tax  liability  by  $40  in the earlier  period,  it  could  have invested  the  $40 and
earned a pretax return of $40 (100%)  by the retirement period. The  $40 would  have been taxed at 40%,
leaving  the  firm with  $64.  By  reducing  its tax  liability  in  the retirement  period,  the  firm has only  an
extra  $40, or  $24 less.  Thus,  the  $24  gain to  the  executive  from  the use of a deferred-compensation
arrangement  designed to put the executive in the same position as an employee  under a qualified 401(k)
comes at the expense of the firm.
52.  For  an explanation  of the tax  effects  of deferred  compensation  under  various  scenarios,  see
SCHOLES ET  AL.,  supra note 24,  at  181-85.
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the  same  tax rate,  the  investment  returns  available  to  the firm  may be higher
than those available to the executive (although,  as we noted in our discussion of
SERPs,  this  is  unlikely  to  be  the  case  for  companies  with  easy  access  to
capital).  However,  there  is  no  reason  to believe  that,  absent  the tax  subsidy
provided by  qualified plans, there is generally a benefit to the parties when the
firm  defers the executive's  compensation.  In many cases, the tax burden on the
firm  is greater than the tax benefit to the executive,  increasing the total tax that
the two parties pay to the government.
Consider,  for  example,  the  case  in  which  an  executive  of  a  profitable
company  is promised  a return  that is  linked to  a stock  index. If the  executive
invests the money in shares of a stock index fund, the  gains will be taxed at  the
long-term  federal  capital-gains  rate, which in the  highest bracket  is  15%  (as of
2004). 53  If,  instead,  the  firm  invests  the  money-in  those  shares,  other
investments,  or  its  own  business-the  gains  could be  taxed at  the  marginal
corporate rate of 35%.
54
Thus,  it  is  puzzling  that  over  90%  of firms  offer  deferred-compensation
programs  to their executives.55  As in the  case of SERPs, there are good reasons
to  think  that,  in  many  firms,  such  programs  are  not  an  efficient  form  of
compensation.  It  is  curious  that  firms  offering  nonqualified  deferred-
compensation  arrangements to executives  do not  offer such nonqualified plans
to  other  employees.  After  all,  if nonqualified  deferred  compensation  is  an
efficient  form  of  compensation  for  the  executives  of  certain  firms-say,
because  the  firms  have  better  investment  opportunities  than the  executives-
nonqualified  deferred  compensation  should  also  be  an  efficient  form  of
compensation  for the nonexecutive  employees of these  firms. But firms rarely,
if  ever,  provide  nonexecutive  employees  with  the  option  of  nonqualified
deferred-compensation  arrangements  in  addition  to  their  401(k)  plans.  This
pattern  suggests  that,  in  most  cases,  offering  nonqualified  deferred
compensation  to  an  executive  does  not  increase  the  joint  wealth  of  the
executive  and the firm.
53.  I.R.C. §  1.
54.  I.R.C.  §  11.  As in  the case of SERPs, a firm can reduce the tax  cost of deferred  compensation
by  using  company-owned  life  insurance.  Under  this  strategy,  the  firm  uses  after-tax  dollars  to  buy
insurance on the lives of its  executives and other employees. Part of the premium is invested, increasing
the  "cash  value"  of the  policy.  The policy  is  then cashed  out  when  funds  are needed  to pay  deferred
compensation.  The  tax  savings  come  from  life  insurance  policies'  capacity  to shelter  from  taxes  the
buildup  of the  cash  value.  However,  because  the insurance  company  charges  fees,  the use  of a life
insurance policy  to avoid taxes gives rise to transaction costs. A 1996 study found that 70%  of the 1,000
largest firms  did not  use  insurance  for funding deferred  compensation,  which  suggests that these  costs
can be quite high. See Christopher  Drew & David Cay Johnston, Special Tax Breaks Enrich Savings of
Many in theRanks of Management,  N.Y. TIMES, Oct.  13,  1996,  §  1, at 1.
55.  Clark Consulting, supra note 21,  at 2.Berkeley Business Law Journal
B. Camouflage Benefits
While  it is far from  clear that deferred-compensation  arrangements  provide
efficiency  benefits,  their  camouflage  value  is  substantial.  The  compensation
being deferred must be reported in the summary compensation table in the year
in  which  it  would  otherwise  have  been  received.  However,  the  substantial
benefits  that have been  conferred by the deferred-compensation plan-the tax-
free  (and  sometimes  above-market)  buildup  over  time-are  not  evident  to
outsiders.
Even  assuming  that  the  nominal  rate  of  return  used  by  a  deferred-
compensation  arrangement  is  no  higher  than  the  market  rate,  the  effective
interest  rate  earned  by  executives  is  higher  than  it  appears  because  of the
substantial  tax  benefits.  Executives  must  pay  taxes  on  investment  income
earned  outside deferred-compensation  arrangements,  but investing  within such
plans  provides  them-at  the  expense  of  the  firm-with  a  tax-free  buildup.
Thus, as  long  as  the  rate  of return  in  deferred-compensation  arrangements  is
above the executive's  after-tax  rate of return, the executive  makes  substantial
gains that  do  not  show  up  in  the compensation  tables.  The New  York  Times
reported,  for example,  that  CEO  Roberto  Goizueta  of Coca-Cola  was  able  to
defer  taxes  on  $1  billion  of  compensation  and  investment  gains  over  a
seventeen-year  period.5
6  Coca-Cola  picked  up  the  tab,  paying  taxes  on  the
earnings  needed  to  cover  the  returns  credited  to  Goizueta's  deferred-
compensation account.
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Furthermore,  while  401(k)  plans  offer  lower-level  workers  returns
equivalent  to  those  available  in  the  bond  or  stock  markets,  many  deferred-
compensation  arrangements have provided executives  with substantially  higher
returns.  These  executives  have  thus  received  investment  income  that  was not
only tax-free  for them  (at the expense  of the firm) but also above-market.  The
benefits from these above-market  returns have also been hidden to a significant
extent.
The SEC  requires  firms to include  in the summary  compensation table  the
above-market  interest  earned  that  year  by  each  executive  on  deferred
compensation. In the case of a guaranteed interest rate, "above-market"  interest
is defined  as  returns  in  excess  of  120%  of the applicable  federal  rate  (AFR)
used by the IRS at the time the guaranteed  interest rate  is set, multiplied by the
amount  of  deferred  compensation.  By  exploiting  the  SEC's  definition  of
"above-market  rate,"  firms  have  sometimes  been  able  to  provide  their
executives with rates of return that are higher than those they could get on their
own without including this benefit in the compensation tables.
56.  Tax Deferred Pay  for Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.  18,  1996, at A36.
57.  According to Coca-Cola's  annual reports  to shareholders,  it paid taxes  on its income  in every
year of Goizueta's tenure  except in  1992.
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The  threshold  used  by  firms  for  "market"  long-term  rates  of  return  is
especially  generous because boards  can  reset  interest rates  whenever doing  so
benefits executives. If market  interest rates and the AFR rise so that the current
guaranteed  rate  is not  especially  attractive,  the  firm  can  simply  adopt  a new,
higher, guaranteed rate. As long as the reset rate is lower than  120%  of the new,
higher  AFR,  the  additional  interest  accruals  need  not  be  reported  in  the
summary  compensation  table.  If, however,  market  interest  rates  and the  AFR
fall, the firm can continue to pay at the old guaranteed rate, which is now above
market.  And  because  the  AFR  used  for  the  disclosure  threshold  is  that
prevailing when  the  guaranteed  interest  rate  was  initially set,  no  matter how
low  market  rates  drop,  the  above-market  interest  paid to the  executive  never
appears in the compensation  table.
Finally,  even  benefits  that  have  come  from  rates  of return  exceeding  the
SEC's threshold  are unlikely  to  be fully  reflected  in the  compensation  tables.
The reporting  requirement  ends when the  executive  retires, but  the  executive
often  has  the  option  to  continue  enjoying  the  above-market  rates  after
retirement.  Such  a  stream  of post-retirement  benefits-which  could  be  quite
substantial  in  value-would  never  appear  in  the  firm's  publicly  filed
compensation tables.
As  in  the  case  of  SERPs,  deferred-compensation  plans  could  expose
executives  to the risk of firm  bankruptcy. While  401(k) plans must be backed
by  their  assets,  which  cannot  be  seized  by  the  firm's  creditors,  deferred-
compensation  arrangements  are  simply  a  promise  by  the  firm  to  pay
compensation  in  the  future.  The  executives  owed  this  compensation  are
unsecured creditors who may not be paid in full if the firm becomes insolvent.
As in the case of SERPs, Congress is considering legislation that would make it
difficult  for firms to shield  executives from this possibility. To date, however,
firms have often taken steps to insulate  executives  from insolvency risk. Many
firms have  used "security  devices,"  such as trusts,  to ensure that funds will be
available to the executives.  In addition,  firms have usually permitted executives
to  withdraw  deferred  compensation  at  any  time-such  as  when  inside
information  suggests that a firm is about to fail.  Shortly before Enron filed  for
bankruptcy, for example, its executives withdrew millions of dollars of deferred
compensation.
For  executives  and  their  friends  on  the  board,  SERPs  and  deferred
compensation  have  been  very  useful.  They  have  provided  a  means  for
channeling  large  amounts  of performance-insensitive  compensation  in  a  way
that,  under  current  disclosure  regulations,  has  not  been  highly  visible  to
outsiders.  As  one  compensation  analyst  pointed  out:  "The  disclosure  of the
myriad  executive  compensation  plans-pension,  supplemental  executive
retirement  plans,  deferred  compensation,  split-dollar  life  insurance-is  not
adequate  in answering  a fundamental  question:  what is the projected value  ofBerkeley Business Law Journal
these plans to the executive upon his retirement?" 58
V. POST-RETIREMENT  PERKS AND CONSULTING CONTRACTS
We  now  turn to consider  the  use  of post-retirement  perks  and  consulting
contracts  to  convey  a  significant  amount  of performance-decoupled  value  to
executives  in a way that is not transparent  to shareholders.  Part  V.A describes
some of the perks provided to executives and explains why they are unlikely to
result from arm's-length bargaining between the parties. Part V.B  examines the
use of post-retirement consulting agreements.
A.  Perks
Many  compensation  contracts  promise  executives  a  substantial  stream  of
perks after retirement. For example,  many executives receive  a certain number
of hours  of corporate  aircraft use  annually  for themselves,  and  sometimes  for
their  families  and  guests  as  well.  Some  executives  have  even  received
unlimited lifetime use of corporate aircraft.59 Other perks that often follow the
executive into retirement include chauffeured  cars, personal assistants, financial
planning,  home-security  systems,  club  memberships,  sports  tickets,  office
space,  secretarial  help,  and  cell  phone  service.  Outgoing  IBM  CEO  Louis
Gerstner,  for  example,  was  given  access  to  apartments,  planes,  cars,  home-
security  services,  and  financial  planning.  Terrence  Murray,  former  CEO  of
FleetBoston, received  150 hours of company aircraft use,  a chauffeured  car, an
office, office assistants,  financial planning, and a home-security system.
Another  common benefit  is giving contributions  to  charities designated  by
the  retiring  executive.  FleetBoston  gave  retiring  CEO  Murray  the  ability  to
direct  $3.5  million of the  firm's charitable  contributions  to Murray's favorite
institutions.  In  addition,  Ford  promised  retiring  CEO  Jacques  Nasser  to
endow a scholarship in his name at the educational institution of his choice (in
addition to providing Nasser a new car each year, financial-planning assistance,
an office, and an assistant).62
Most of these  perks cost  the company  more than may be  apparent at first
58.  Gretchen  Morgenson,  Executive Pay, Hiding Behind Small Print,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Feb. 8, 2004,  §
3,1.
59.  Nell Minow,  CEO Contract  Provisions: The  Use of Company  Aircraft,  The Corporate  Library
(Special  Report)  (Oct.  2001),  at  http://www.thecorporatelibrary.comnspecial/misc/aircrafl.html  (last
visited Nov.  14,2004).
60.  See Lublin, supra note  34; Gary  Strauss,  CEOs Cash In After Tenure, USA  TODAY,  Apr. 25,
2002, at  lB.
61.  See Agreement, available  at
http://contracts.corporate.findlaw.com/agreements/fleetboston/murray.emp.2001.10.10.htm  (last visited
November 8, 2004).
62.  Joann  S. Lublin, How CEOs Retire in Style: Many Former Chief  Executives Get Lush Perks
and Fat Fees  for Limited "Consulting" Work, WALL ST. J.,  Sept. 13, 2002, at B1.
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glance.  Consider retiree use of corporate jets, now  a common perk.  Although
the  marginal  cost of allowing  a  retired executive  to  use the company jet may
63 appear  limited,  it can run quite high. Consider the use of a company plane for
a flight from New York to California and then back several  days later. Because
the New  York-based aircraft and flight crew will  return  to  the East Coast after
dropping  the  retired  executive  off, the  actual  charge  to  the company  is  two
round  trips:  a  total  of eight takeoffs  and  landings  and  approximately  twenty
hours  of flying time, most likely costing-for fuel, maintenance,  landing fees,
extra  pilot and crew  fees,  incidentals,  and depreciation  (an aircraft's  operating
life  is reduced for every hour it flies and, more important, for every takeoff and
landing)-at  least  $50,000.64  Henry  R.  Silverman,  CEO  of  Cendant,  was
promised  lifetime  use  of the corporate  aircraft or, if the plane  was  in use,  an
equivalent chartered plane at a direct cost of thousands of dollars per hour.
6 5
Firms  usually  do  not  provide  post-retirement  perks  to  nonexecutive
employees.  There  is  good  economic  logic  to  avoiding  such  in-kind
compensation.  Promising  a retiring  employee  $10,000  a year for  certain travel
expenses  is  less  efficient  than  providing  $10,000  in  cash.  The  reason  is
straightforward. If the retiree views travel as the best way to spend $10,000,  the
cash  and  the  travel  coverage  will  have  identical  utility.  However,  cash  is
superior  if there  are  any  possible  circumstances  in  which  the  retiree  would
prefer spending some or all of the money on goods or services other than travel,
because the retiree will receive greater utility at the same cost to the firm.
A  retiree's  needs  and  preferences  are  likely  to  change  over  time.  Thus,
economic  logic  suggests  that if in-kind  retirement benefits  are  provided,  they
should  not be provided  for long periods.  Yet such  long-term, in-kind benefits
are  often  provided  to  retired  CEOs:  for  example,  Louis  Gerstner  of  IBM
received  use  of a  plane,  cars,  offices,  and financial  planning  services  for  ten
years.
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Although  post-retirement  perks  are  unlikely  to  be  an  efficient  form  of
compensation,  they  offer  an  effective  means  of camouflaging  compensation.
The value of post-retirement  perks is not reported when they are agreed to, and
the firm incurs costs  only after the executive  has left, at which point any value
provided  is  no  longer  included  in  the  salient  summary  compensation  table.
Post-retirement  perks thus  offer yet another way of providing additional  value
to  executives  without  ever  having  to  include  the  benefits  in  compensation
tables or even place a dollar value on them.
63.  This misperception  led one  compensation  consultant, Yale  D.  Tauber, to  label jet  use as  "an
efficient way of delivering something of value  to the executive."  Lublin, supra note 34.
64.  We  thank  Marc  Abramowitz  and  Yitz  Applebaum  for  useful  discussions  on  the  cost  of
operating corporate jets.
65.  Minow, supra note 59.
66.  Strauss, supra note 60.Berkeley Business Law Journal
Firms  in the  past have  sometimes  grudgingly  provided vague  descriptions
about  post-retirement  perks,  but  these  descriptions  did  not  generally  allow
shareholders  to  form  a good picture  of the  scope  and value  of these benefits.
For example, former General  Electric CEO Jack Welch received approximately
$2.5  million  in benefits  in his  first year of retirement, including  access to GE
aircraft  for unlimited  personal  use  and  for business  travel,  exclusive  use of a
furnished  New York City apartment,  and unrestricted  access  to  a chauffeured
limousine  (among  other  things). 7  However,  GE's  proxy  statements  revealed
only that in retirement Welch would be entitled to "continued lifetime access to
Company  facilities  and  services  comparable  to  those  that  are  currently  made
available  to him by the Company."6 8  Thus, GE  not  only failed to  put a dollar
value on the perks, but did not bother even to describe them.
B. Consulting  Contracts
Like  perks,  consulting  contracts  provide  substantial  value  to  retired
executives.  They  usually  offer  the  retiring  CEO  an  annual  fee  for  "being
available"  to  advise  the new  CEO  for  a  specified  amount  of time  per year.
Approximately  25%  of  CEOs  negotiate  a  post-retirement  "consulting"
relationship  with their old firm.
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For example, AOL Time Warner is paying retired CEO Gerald M. Levin $1
million  a  year to  serve as  an adviser  for up  to  five days  a month.7°  In 2000,
retiring  Carter-Wallace  CEO  Henry  Hoyt  was promised  annual  payments  of
$831,000.  for  a  similar  monthly  obligation.71  Verizon  co-CEO  Charles  Lee
negotiated  a  $6  million  consulting  contract  for  the  first  two  years  of  his
retirement.  Delta  Airlines  CEO  Ronald  Allen's  1997  retirement  package
provided  him  with  a  seven-year,  $3.5  million  consulting  deal  under  which,
according  to Delta's public filings, he was  "required  to perform his consulting
services  at such times, and in such places, and for such periods as will result in
the  least  inconvenience  to  him."72  Allen  or  his  heirs  will  be  entitled  to  the
annual  fee of $500,000 even if he is totally disabled or dies.73
These  consulting arrangements  provide  flat, guaranteed fees  for the retired
executive's "being  available" rather than payment for work  actually done, and
for a  good reason:  companies  generally  make  little  use  of the availability  for
67.  General  Electric  Settles  SEC Action  for  Disclosure  Failures  in Connection  with  Its  Former
CEO's Benefits Under His Employment and Retirement  Agreement,  SEC News Digest, Issue No. 2004-
184 (Sept.  23,  2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/dig092304.txt  (last  visited Nov.  11,
2004).
68.  Id.
69.  Strauss, supra note 60 (quoting Ira Kay of consulting  firm Watson Wyatt).
70.  Lublin, supra  note 62.
71.  Strauss, supra note 60.
72.  Id.
73.  Lublin, supra  note 62.
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which  they  pay  generously.  For  better  or  worse,  new  CEOs  are  usually  not
inclined to seek advice from their predecessors.74 Allen, for example, reportedly
"rarely  talks"  with  the  new  Delta  chief  executive,  Leo  Mullin.  Even
compensation  consultants  acknowledge  that retired executives add  little if any
value to the firm under these arrangements. According  to Frank Glassner, CEO
of Compensation Design  Group, most of these consulting  contracts  are merely
a  way  of  increasing  the  severance  payment  to  the  departing  executive.
According  to  another  executive  compensation  expert,  Alan  Johnson,  "Most
former  CEOs  are  doing very  little for what they're  getting paid ....  Usually,
the demands [from new management]  are miniscule."
Like  post-retirement  perks,  the  consulting  payments  to  retired executives
never  find their  way into  the  summary  compensation  tables  because they  are
provided  when the  executives  are no  longer  officers.  However,  in contrast  to
post-retirement  benefits,  these  contracts  enable  boards  to  provide  retired
executives  with cash rather  than in-kind benefits. 75 Retirement  consulting fees
are essentially a  cash severance payment,  turned over in installments,  disguised
as compensation  for post-retirement work.
If these  fees  are  just a form  of cash  severance,  what  is the  advantage  of
packaging them as consulting agreements?  Besides ensuring that  the payments
are  kept out of the  compensation  tables,  dressing  them up  as  consulting  fees
obscures  their nature  as  severance  payments that essentially  increase  the total
compensation  received  by  executives  for  their  pre-retirement  work.  Some
observers  might  believe  that  the  outgoing  CEO  will  in  fact  provide  valuable
advice  to  new  management,  and  therefore  view  the  payments  as  legitimate
consideration  for  post-retirement  services.  Needless  to  say,  these  consulting
agreements  do not tie the retired executive's pay to any personal contribution to
shareholder value either before or after retirement.
VI. TRANSPARENCY
A.  The Critical  Role of Transparency
We turn  in this  Section to discussing the policy  implications of our study.
Our  study highlights the importance of making compensation  arrangements  in
general,  and compensation  via retirement benefits  in particular,  transparent  to
public  investors. Although we argue elsewhere  for reforms that would increase
74,  Id.
75.  Of course, there are  cases where even these outlays are hidden by the provision of in-kind value
rather than cash.  For departing CEO Hugh McColl's continuing  "advice  and counsel,"  Bank of America
is  providing  him  or members  of his  family  with  150 hours  of flying  time  on  corporate  aircraft.  See
Strauss, supra note 60. This perk has a value of $500,000 or more.Berkeley Business Law Journal
shareholder power,76  shareholders  do already  have some power. This power  is
in part why the outrage  constraint matters. The greater outsiders' understanding
of compensation arrangements,  the tighter the outrage constraint. Improving  the
transparency of compensation arrangements  is therefore  desirable.
Financial  economists  have  paid  insufficient  attention  to  transparency
because  they  often  focus  on  the  role  of  disclosure  in  getting  information
incorporated  into market pricing. It is widely believed that information  can be
reflected in stock prices as long as it is known and fully understood  by even  a
limited number of market professionals.
In  the  case  of  executive  compensation,  there  is  already  significant
disclosure.  As we have  discussed,  SEC  regulations  require  detailed disclosure
of  the  compensation  of  a  company's  CEO  and  of  the  four  most  highly
compensated  executives  other  than  the  CEO.  In  our  view,  however,  it  is
important  to recognize  the difference between disclosure and transparency,  and
it is transparency that should receive more attention.
The main  aim of requiring  disclosure  of executive  compensation  is  not to
enable  accurate  pricing  of  the  firm's  securities.  Rather,  this  disclosure  is
primarily  intended  to  provide  some  check  on  arrangements  that  are  too
favorable  to  executives.  This  goal  is  not  well  served  by  disseminating
information  in  a  way  that  makes  the  information  understandable  to  a  small
number of market professionals but opaque  to others.
The  ability  of  plan  designers  to  favor  managers  depends  on  how
compensation  arrangements  are  perceived  by  a  wide  group  of investors  and
other  outsiders.  Because of market  forces  and social  dynamics,  managers  and
directors  are  concerned  about  disapproval  (threatened  or  actual)  from
institutional  investors  or other reference  groups, such  as  the business  press  or
popular media. We  have seen that compensation  designers  often seek to make
the amount  of pay, or the  extent to  which pay is decoupled  from performance,
less  transparent.  For  disclosure  to  constrain  compensation  effectively,  the
disclosed  information  must  reach  more  than just  a  select  group  of market
professionals  and  arbitrageurs.  Raw  facts  buried  in  a  mountain  of technical
disclosure  probably  will not  suffice.  The  salience  of disclosure  and degree  of
transparency  are important.
B. Putting  Retirement Benefits on the Radar  Screen
Public  officials and governance  reformers,  therefore, should work to ensure
that compensation arrangements  are and remain transparent. Having shown that
pensions,  deferred  compensation,  and  post-retirement  perks  and  consulting
contracts have  been used to camouflage  a significant  amount of performance-
76.  See BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT  PERFORMANCE,  supra note 1, at ch.  16.
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decoupled  compensation,  we  now put  forward  several  proposals  designed  to
put these forms of compensation on investors' radar screens.
As we explain in more detail below, firms should be required to report each
year  the  (present)  dollar  value  of  the  future  benefits  to  which  executives
become  entitled  during  the  year  in  connection  with  SERPs,  deferred
compensation,  and post-retirement  perks  and  consulting  arrangements.  These
monetary  values  should  be  included  in  the  firm's  annual  summary
compensation  table. The SEC  should  also require  firms  to provide  a separate
table  disclosing  the  present  value  of  all  the  retirement  benefits-SERP
payments,  deferred  compensation  balances,  and  post-retirement  perks  and
consulting arrangements-to  which the  CEO and other high ranking executives
would be entitled were they to  separate  at year  end (under each of the  various
termination  scenarios  contemplated  in  their  employment  contracts).  Before
proceeding,  it  is  worth  noting  that  SERPs,  deferred  compensation,  and post-
retirement perks and  consulting  contracts are  not necessarily  the only  forms of
stealth compensation.  Firms have provided-and will continue to look for ways
to  provide-other  forms  of stealth  compensation.  Thus,  while  our proposals
will substantially  reduce  the ability  of firms  to provide  stealth  compensation,
they will not eliminate it completely.
Disclosing the Full Details of Executive  Compensation Contracts. Firms
should be required  to disclose  in  their annual  proxy  filing the  full text of the
most recent versions of the employment  contracts that the firm has entered into
with high-level  executives.  Firms often file  such agreements  with forms  other
than the  annual  proxy  statement  that  are  not  as  closely  followed.  Requiring
firms to  attach executive  compensation  contracts to their  most important  SEC
filing,  which contains  the  summary  compensation  table  and  other key  details
about  compensation,,  will  make  executive  compensation  agreements  more
accessible and salient.
However,  requiring  firms  to disclose  in  an accessible  and salient  way  the
text  of executive  compensation  contracts  is  far  from  enough.  While  experts
who take the  time to do so may be able to calculate the  monetary  value of the
various  forms of stealth  compensation provided  in these contracts,  these values
are not as transparent  to investors  as the  dollar values reported for many other
forms  of executive  compensation.  To make  the information  contained in these
compensation  contracts  more  transparent  and  accessible,  firms  should  be
required  to  attach  monetary  values  to  each of the types  of compensation  we
have  discussed. That  is,  the SEC  should  require firms  to  report compensation
via retirement payments, deferred compensation, and post-retirement perks  and
consulting  contracts  in  the  same  manner  as  other forms  of compensation:  by
putting a dollar value on these amounts and including them in the compensation
tables  accompanying  firms'  proxy filings. We explain  below, for each type  of
retirement benefit we have discussed, how this can be accomplished.Berkeley  Business Law Journal
SERPs. As  we  explained,  SERP  payouts  are  generally  based  on  years  of
service  and  historic  compensation  levels.  The  actuarial  value  of  SERPs
therefore  usually  increases  each  year.  The  annual  buildup  in  value  of  an
executive's  SERP  is  not,  under  current  rules,  reported  in  firms'  annual
summary  compensation  tables.  Nor  are  the  payments  themselves,  which  are
made after the executive retires.
We  propose  requiring  firms  to  add  a  column  in  the  annual  summary
compensation  table for  SERPs.  This  column  would  indicate,  for each  of the
firm's  highest-paid  executives, the amount by  which the actuarial  value  of the
executive's  SERPs  increases  each  year.  Firms  should  also  provide  an
accompanying  explanation of the  reasons  for  the  increases  in  actuarial  value
reported in the compensation tables.
Deferred Compensation. Recall  that  firms  currently  must  report  in  the
publicly  filed  summary  compensation  tables  only  "above-market"  returns
credited  to  executives'  deferred  compensation  accounts.  As  we  explained,
however,  firms  have  been  able  to  exploit  the  SEC's  definition  of "above-
market"  to  provide  above-market  returns  without  disclosing  them  in  the
compensation  tables. Moreover,  firms have  not been required to report the tax
benefit to the executive-which  comes at the expense of the firm-provided by
deferred compensation  arrangements.
We  propose  adding disclosure  requirements  that  would  provide  outsiders
with  a  clear  and  full  picture  of  the  gains  to  executives  from  deferred
compensation  programs.  Firms  should  be required  to  disclose  each  year  the
value  of an executive's  deferred compensation  account at the  beginning of the
year, the amount of earnings credited to this account by the end of the year, and
the  basis  on  which  these  earnings  were  determined.  This  information  will
enable  outsiders  to  decide  for  themselves  whether  and  to  what  extent
executives  enjoy above-market returns.
Firms should also report to investors the tax cost to the firm of covering the
earnings. For example,  if a firm in the 33%  tax bracket credits  $600,000 to an
executive's  deferred  compensation  account, the  firm should  disclose  not only
the $600,000  credited  to  the  account,  but also  the  $300,000  in  taxes that  the
firm must pay on the $900,000  in pre-tax income  needed to cover the  $600,000
earnings credited to the executive's account.
Finally, it is necessary to ensure that summary  compensation tables include
the  full  monetary  value  executives  derive  from  deferred  compensation.  We
propose  that  compensation  tables  include  a  column  reporting  this  monetary
value.  In calculating this  value, firms  should be  required to regard  as "above-
market"  any returns  exceeding  the AFR-not only returns  exceeding  120%  of
this rate. For this purpose, firms  should be required  to use the  AFR for short-
term loans  in effect at the beginning of the firm's fiscal year. Furthermore,  and
perhaps  more  importantly,  the  monetary  value  included  in  the  compensation
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tables should include any gains to the executive  that come  from having returns
accumulate tax-free  at the company's expense.
Post-retirement  Perks and Consulting Contracts.  Post-retirement  perks and
consulting contracts never appear in the summary  compensation tables because
the  value  is provided to  the  executive  after she  retires.  This  is the  case  even
when  such  arrangements  are  promised  in the executive's  contract  long before
the  executive  retires-either  when  she  is  initially  hired  or  later  when  she
negotiates a new contract.
The  SEC  should modify  the  compensation tables to  include  a  column  for
post-retirement  perks  and  consulting  contracts.  Firms  should  be  required  to
report,  in this column, the actuarial  present value of post-retirement perks  and
consulting  contracts  promised to  executives.  Critically,  these  amounts  should
be  disclosed as  soon  as the executive  is promised these payments-not  when
the  payments  are  made  and  the executive  is  already  out  the  door.  Thus,  for
example,  if an incoming CEO  negotiates  a package  that includes  the  use of a
corporate jet for ten years after he retires, the firm should place a dollar amount
on the value of this arrangement  and include  that amount in the entry for non-
SERP retirement payments.
Disclosing the Retirement Kitty. The proposals we have just offered would
require  firms  to report  the  compensation  executives  receive  each  year  in the
form of buildup  in pension  value,  earnings,  and  tax  benefits  associated  with
deferred  compensation,  and promises  of post-retirement  perks  and  consulting
contracts.  In  addition,  firms  should  be  required  to  put  all  this  information
together  to  provide  a  complete  picture  of how  much  the  executive  would
receive  from the  firm if she  were to separate  at the end of the year, under each
of the termination scenarios described in her employment contract.
In particular, the SEC  should  require  firms to  publish a table  showing  the
actuarial  value  of each high ranking executive's  SERP  at  the end of the  year,
the balances in any deferred  compensation  accounts, and the value of any post-
retirement  perks  and  consulting  contract  to  which  the  executive  would  be
entitled  if she  were  to  resign,  retire,  or  otherwise  separate  from  the  firm  at
year's end. This picture will better enable shareholders to form a judgment as to
whether it is necessary for the  firm  to continue spending money to ensure that
the  executive  has  a  comfortable  retirement.  The  table  will  also  enable
shareholders to easily  see whether executives  will enjoy a "soft  landing" even if
they are pushed out for failure.
We  should emphasize  that a retirement-payout  table  is not a  substitute  for
our  proposals  to  expand  the  annual  summary  compensation  tables  to  include
the  yearly  monetary  value  associated  with  SERP  buildup,  deferred
compensation  programs,  and promises of post-retirement  perks  and consulting
contracts.  These measures  are  necessary  to  make transparent  to investors  how
much  executives  have  been  paid  during  the  past  year,  as  well  as  to  helpBerkeley Business Law Journal
investors estimate the relationship between  annual pay and the executives'  own
performance.  In  contrast,  the  retirement-payout  table  is  necessary  to  make
transparent  to  investors  the  extent, if any, to  which  it would  be  necessary  for
subsequent  pay  packages  to  provide  executives  with  additional  retirement
benefits.
Transparency and Improved Compensation Arrangements. The  measures
above  would  provide  shareholders  with  a  more  accurate  picture  of  total
executive  compensation.  They  will  thereby  reduce  the  total  amount  of
compensation  executives  could  get  below  the  radar  screen.  These  measures
could  thus  help  constrain  total  compensation  levels.  More  importantly,  these
measures  also  would  reduce  the  distortions  that  arise when  companies  choose
particular  forms  of compensation  for  their  camouflage  value  rather  than  for
their efficiency.  Improving  transparency  in this  area  could  thus  substantially
increase shareholder value.
Our  analysis  has  focused  on  the  most  important  forms  of  stealth
compensation  via retirement  benefits that have been  used  by  firms to  date. Of
course, designers  of compensation  plans may find  and use new ways  to make
compensation,  or  its  insensitivity  to  performance,  more  opaque.  As  new
practices  (and  new  means  of camouflage)  develop,  disclosure  arrangements
should be updated to ensure transparency. Regulators  adopting the measures we
propose  should  continue  to  monitor compensation  arrangements  and  to refine
disclosure requirements  as new ways of making pay  less salient are developed.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has explained how retirement benefits and payments have been
used to  camouflage  the  payment  of large  amounts  of performance-insensitive
compensation to executives  of public companies.  Our study has highlighted the
significant role that camouflage  and stealth compensation play in the design of
compensation  arrangements,  as  well  as  the  importance  of  ensuring  that
information about compensation  arrangements  be communicated  in a way that
is transparent and accessible to outsiders.
We  have  also  proposed  several  measures  aimed  at  putting  retirement
benefits  on  investors'  radar  screens.  Among  other things,  firms  should  make
transparent, on a timely basis, both the monetary benefits to executives  and the
cost to  firms of the various arrangements  we  have described.  In particular, the
summary  compensation  table  firms  must  publicly  file  should  include  entries
that indicate:  (1) the amount by which the actuarial  value of executives'  SERP
plans  increases  each year;  (2)  the  monetary  value  executives  derive  that year
from the  firm's deferred compensation  plans, including the value  of a tax-free
buildup at the firm's expense;  and (3)  the present value of post-retirement perks
and  consulting  contracts  promised  to  the  executives  during  the  year.  Firms
should also be required to  include a separate  table  showing how much of each
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form of retirement compensation  a high ranking  executive would receive  if she
were  to separate  at the end of the  year under each of the termination scenarios
contemplated  by her contract.  By making  it more  difficult to  camouflage  pay
through  retirement  benefits,  the  proposed  requirements  would  contribute  to
improving compensation  arrangements.Berkeley Business  Law Journal Vol.  1: No. 2,2004